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The corporate income tax in the United States provides only limited
tax relief to firms that report tax losses. Firms that have paid positive
taxes during the three years prior to the loss year may "carry back"
their losses and receive a tax refund, provided it does not exceed their
total taxes in those three years. For some firms, however, current losses
exceed potential carrybacks. This may happen when a firm experiences
losses in several consecutive years, or when it incurs an especially
large loss in a single year. Firms that exhaust their potential carrybacks
must carry losses forward, using them to offset future taxable earnings.
For these firms, the marginal tax rate on current earnings, as well as
the value of tax deductions, depends critically upon when, and if, they
regain their taxable status. Firms that anticipate persistent loss car-
ryforwards will in effect face very low marginal tax rates.
Imperfect loss-offset provisions may substantially alter the incentive
effects of the corporate income tax. Two features of the tax, the in-
centive to undertake new investment and the incentive to use debt as
opposed to equity finance, are particularly sensitive because loss-car-
ryforward firms may be unable to claim the benefits of depreciation or
of interest tax shields.
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Standard analyses of corporate investment incentives assume that
firms claim depreciation allowances and investment tax credits as they
accrue. For firms with loss carryforwards, however, accrual and re-
alization occur at different dates. This timing difference can change
both the relative tax incentives for investments in plant and equipment,
and the overall investment incentive facing the firm. For assets with
high tax burdens, typically those with long depreciation lives, such as
structures, a loss-carryforward firm may have a greater incentive to
invest than a currently taxable firm. This occurs because the gain from
postponing the tax payments on the asset's earnings exceeds the loss
from postponing its tax depreciation benefits. The opposite result may
obtain for assets with highly accelerated depreciation allowances, such
as equipment. For these assets, the cost of delayed realization of the
depreciation benefits may exceed the gain from deferring taxes on the
project's profits, and loss-carryforward firms may therefore face smaller
investment incentives than taxable firms.
Loss-offset provisions may also exert an important influence on cor-
porate financing choices. Interest deductions are worth less to a loss-
carryforward firm than to a currently taxable firm, so a firm with a tax-
loss carryforward has less incentive to use debt finance than does a
currently taxable firm. In addition, a firm's probability of experiencing
future loss carryforwards may depend upon its financial policy, since
higher interest deductions lower taxable profits and raise the chance
of realizing losses. This has led some to propose a theory of corporate
capital structure based on the proposition that firms borrow until the
expected marginal cost of additional debt due to the increased prob-
ability of becoming nontaxable and losing preexisting tax shields equals
the expected marginal benefit of additional deductions when taxable.
This theory implies that tax systems with more generous loss-offset
provisions provide a greater incentive for corporate borrowing.
Several recent studies have suggested that the loss-carryforward pro-
visions of corporate tax codes are of more than academic interest.
Cordes and Sheffrin (1983) analyzed the distribution of corporate mar-
ginal tax rates on additional interest deductions, and estimated that
only 56% of corporate receipts accrued to firms that paid the maximum
statutory corporate tax rate on marginal earnings. This is due to the
combined effect of tax-loss carryforwards and binding income-linked
constraints on the use of investment and foreign tax credits.
1 In Canada,
Mintz (1985) reports that only half of the investment in manufacturing
is undertaken by currently taxable firms, and the incidence of loss-
carryforward firms is much higher in some other sectors, such as min-
ing. For Great Britain, Mayer (1986) cites evidence that, during the
early 1980s, only 40% of British companies were paying corporation307 Tax-Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives
tax on marginal profits. The stock of tax-loss carryforwards in the
United Kingdom was nearly three times as large as the annual revenue
yield of the corporation tax.
This paper presents new evidence on the importance of tax-loss
carryforwards in the United States. It uses a new data set gathered
from corporate annual reports and 10-K forms to investigate the in-
cidence of loss carryforwards, and then examines how effective tax
rates on different assets are affected by loss-offset constraints. The
most important finding is that tax-loss carryforwards are highly per-
sistent and significantly affect investment incentives for some firms.
Nearly 15% of the firms in our sample had tax-loss carryforwards in
1984, and the fraction is much higher in some industries. Analyzing
the effect of the corporate income tax on tax-loss firms is therefore
essential to understanding investment and financing incentives in these
industries. We estimate the persistence of loss carryforwards and use
the results to calculate effective tax rates on new investments in struc-
tures and industrial equipment for both currently taxable and loss-
carryforward firms. We find that the presence of a tax-loss carryforward
has a dramatic effect on a firm's incentive to invest in equipment but
relatively little impact on the incentive to invest in structures.
The paper is divided into five sections. The first outlines the tax rules
governing loss carryforwards and carrybacks. It also explains the dif-
ficulties that arise in using standard data sources to measure tax-loss
carryforwards, and describes our new data set. The second section
presents our basic findings on the importance of firms with tax-loss
carryforwards and examines the persistence of loss carryforwards for
the firms that experience them. The third section outlines how loss-
offset constraints alter the effective tax rates on various assets and
describes our numerical procedures. The fourth section presents our
calculations of the effective tax rates on plant and equipment invest-
ment for both currently taxable and loss-carryforward firms. A con-
cluding section discusses the implications of our results for understand-
ing the allocative effects of the corporate income tax and suggests a
number of directions for future work.
10.1 The Definition and Measurement of Tax-Loss Carryforwards
Loss-offset constraints restrict a firm's ability to obtain tax refunds
when it generates negative taxable profits. A firm that realizes a tax
loss may carry the loss back against tax payments in the previous three
years, provided it does not claim current refunds in excess of total tax
payments in those years. Firms that have exhausted their carrybacks308 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
may carry unused losses forward for a maximum of fifteen years, after
which the losses expire and can no longer be used to reduce tax liability.
Prior to 1981, loss carryforwards expired in five years. For firms with
loss carryforwards, an additional dollar of taxable income has no effect
on current tax liability. The marginal tax burden on an additional dollar
of taxable earnings depends upon when the firm becomes taxable again
in the future.
It is important to distinguish between firms with loss carryforwards
and "firms that pay no taxes."
2 A firm with a tax-loss carryforward in
a given year pays no tax, but it may receive a refund if it can carry
part of the loss back against previous tax payments. A marginal change
in the firm's taxable earnings, however, will have no effect on its current
tax liability. Its current marginal tax rate is zero, although if it expects
to exhaust its loss carryforwards in the near future it will face an
effective marginal tax rate that differs from the statutory tax rate only
by the price of an interest-free loan for the duration of its remaining
tax-loss period.
Not all firms with negative current tax payments have loss carryfor-
wards, however. Some firms that are carrying back current losses may
not have exhausted their carryback potential. For these firms, the mar-
ginal tax rate on additional income is the statutory tax rate, because
an additional dollar of earned income will reduce the amount of their
carryback. These firms face the statutory marginal rate even though
their current tax payments are negative.
Loss carryforwards are not the only factor that may cause a firm's
marginal tax rate to differ from the statutory rate. Cordes and Sheffrin
(1983) explain how constraints on the use of tax credits and the cor-
porate minimum tax also affect the distribution of marginal corporate
tax rates.
3 Unfortunately, publicly available information is not detailed
enough to enable us to measure the marginal tax rates facing individual
corporations. To calculate a firm's carryback potential, we would need
information on its current tax credits, its credit and loss carryforwards,
and even its previous tax payments. These data can only be obtained
from a firm's past and present tax returns, which are confidential.
4 One
type of tax data which can be gathered from published sources is the
identity of firms with tax-loss carryforwards. Corporate annual reports
and 10-K filings typically contain some information on carryforwards,
so we focus on this source of variation in marginal corporate tax rates.
Data limitations prevent us from assessing the significance of firms
with tax-credit carryforwards. Most of the firms that we identified as
having tax-loss carryforwards also reported credit carryforwards. There
may be other firms, however, with credit carryforwards but no loss
carryforwards; Cordes and Sheffrin (1983) suggest that these credit-
carryforward firms account for a substantial fraction of the firms facing309 Tax-Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives
marginal corporate tax rates below the statutory levels. We implicitly
assume that firms either encounter loss and credit carryforwards si-
multaneously or that they encounter neither. Preliminary results, based
on IRS data and incorporating both loss and credit carryforwards, are
reported in Altshuler and Auerbach (1987).
The standard source of machine-readable information on corporate
accounts is the COMPUSTAT data base compiled by Standard and
Poor. Although the data set contains a company's tax-loss carryforward
if the annual report includes one, there are several serious problems
with these data. First, there are two distinct ways of calculating a firm's
tax-loss carryforward. One is for tax purposes, the other is for financial
reporting purposes. In computing financial-reporting loss carryfor-
wards, firms exclude depreciation allowances in excess of straight-line
depreciation. Financial-loss carryforwards may therefore be smaller
than tax-loss carryforwards, because accounting profits are larger than
taxable profits. The two measures also differ in the treatment of dis-
continued operations, write-offs, and many other activities. A firm that
decides to write down its investment in an unprofitable subsidiary may
book a substantial loss but receive no tax benefits for the transaction,
thereby leading financial-reporting losses to exceed tax-purpose losses.
The relevant measure for analyzing corporate incentives is the tax-
purpose loss; unfortunately, if a firm reports both tax and financial-
loss carryforwards, COMPUSTAT records the financial-purpose car-
ryforward. This may lead to spurious classification of firms. Second,
COMPUSTAT aggregates foreign tax-loss carryforwards along with
U.S. carryforwards. For multinational firms, the data may therefore
provide an unreliable description of current tax status.
Firms with loss carryforwards typically report both financial and tax-
purpose data in their annual reports or 10-K statements. These pub-
lished data, although not available in machine-readable form, provide
the basis for our study. We began with the list of COMPUSTAT firms
reporting loss carryforwards for any of the fiscal years from 1981 to
1984. We then consulted the annual reports for each of these firms;
when it was available, we recorded the tax-purpose carryforward. We
also investigated all of the firms on COMPUSTAT with either negative
federal tax payments or zero investment tax credits. In some cases,
we found that firms with COMPUSTAT carryforwards did not have
U.S. tax-basis carryforwards; these were reclassified as loss-free firms.
In other cases, the firms reported only one measure of their loss car-
ryforward and did not indicate whether it was a tax or financial number.
These firms (of which there were very few) were deleted from our
sample. We also deleted all foreign-based firms before investigating the
pattern of loss carryforwards.
5 Our data set includes 1,425 firms, 228
of which experienced tax-loss carryforwards at some point between310 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
1981 and 1984. The total market value of the firms in our sample is
roughly three-quarters of the total market value of the nonfinancial
corporate sector.
There are several potential biases in our data sample that should be
recognized at the outset. First, COMPUSTAT does not include all of
the corporations which file tax returns; there were over three million
such firms in 1982! The firms on COMPUSTAT are large, publicly
traded firms. If losses tend to be more prevalent among smaller or start-
up firms, then we may understate the number of firms with tax-loss
carryforwards. Second, the data set follows COMPUSTAT in including
only firms that were active in 1984. Some corporations that encountered
tax-loss carryforwards in earlier years may either have been taken over
or gone bankrupt, and the end-of-sample sampling rule imparts a clear
selection bias. This may cause us to understate the number of loss-
carryforward firms in 1981 through 1983, although the bias is likely to
be small given the relatively low rate of both bankruptcy and takeover
for firms on the COMPUSTAT tape. A third source of bias arises be-
cause not all firms with losses may report them. Firms are required to
report loss carryforwards only if they are "material"; since some firms
with small carryforwards may not appear as carryforward firms on
COMPUSTAT, we may understate their importance.
A final problem with loss-carryforward data gathered from annual
reports and 10-K filings is the divergence between the divisions of the
firm included on its consolidated tax return and those included on the
financial statements. For example, as Dworin (1985) explains, some
firms do not include their finance subsidiaries in their financial state-
ments although for tax purposes these subsidiaries are consolidated
with the parent corporation.
6 We may therefore classify a parent firm
as having a tax-loss carryforward even though the total taxpaying entity
has no carryforward. This problem is impossible to overcome when
using data published in annual reports.
7
It is difficult to evaluate the impact of these biases. One simple
check involves comparison of our aggregate estimate of loss carry-
forwards with aggregate IRS data. A lower bound for loss carryfor-
wards by nonfinancial corporations can be calculated as the current
deficit reported by firms with current losses, less total losses carried
back. This lower bound was $57.1 billion in 1981 and $75.2 billion in
1982, roughly five times as large as our aggregate estimates. While
the source of this discrepancy is unclear, we believe it is due primarily
to small firms not included in our data and some large firms which do
not report loss carryforwards on their accounting statements. This is
likely to contaminate our estimates of the incidence of tax losses much
more than our estimates of transition probabilities and effective tax
rates.311 Tax-Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives
10.2 The Importance and Persistence of Loss Carryforwards
This section uses our annual-report data set for the post-1981 period,
as well as accounting-purpose loss-carryforward data available on
COMPUSTAT for a longer sample period, to explore the economic
significance of tax-loss carryforwards. We ask how many firms have
carryforwards, and then examine the persistence of these losses.
10.2.1 The Importance of Loss-Carryforward Firms
Table 10.1 presents summary evidence on the importance of firms
with tax-loss carryforwards in the years since 1981. It considers the
total population of nonfinancial firms, as well as some particular in-
dustries. The table shows that about 15% of all firms are in the loss-
carryforward regime. We also weighted firms by their 1984 net book
assets, and found that 5.9% of all assets were held by loss-carryforward
firms.
Table 10.1 also shows that there is substantial concentration of car-
ryforward firms in some industries. In the oil industry (SIC codes 1311
and 2911), for example, nearly a quarter of the firms (accounting for
2% of the common stock) had loss carryforwards in 1984. In 1982 and
1983, 40% of the firms (accounting for about 10% of the value of out-
standing common stock) in motor vehicles and car bodies reported tax
loss carryforwards. In the steel industry, the findings suggest a third
of the firms have losses, and, they account for half of the industry's















































Note: All calculations are based on the authors' data set, which is described in the text.312 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
cidence of loss carryforwards: forty percent of the firms (accounting
for roughly one-tenth of the industry's equity value).
Table 10.2 shows the total value of the loss carryforwards for the
firms in our sample. These carryforwards aggregated to 5.1 billion
dollars in 1981, 10.0 billion in 1982, 15.1 billion in 1983, and 12.8 billion
in 1984. As noted above, the aggregate number for the nonfinancial
corporate sector is probably substantially larger. The center panel in
table 10.2 relates the value of the tax-loss carryforwards to the market
value of the affected firms. In 1984, the nominal value of the carry-
forwards equalled 48% of the equity of the firms with these carryfor-
wards. In some industries, notably steel, autos, and airlines, tax-loss
carryforwards actually exceed the equity value of the loss-carryforward
firms.
To provide additional perspective on the problem of loss-carryforward
firms, table 10.3 displays the twenty largest loss-carryforward firms in
our sample, measured by equity value, with their tax-loss carryfor-
wards for 1983. The table depicts the same industry concentrations
described above: the twenty firms include three railroads, four auto or
heavy machinery manufacturers, four steel companies, and two copper
companies. Although most firms on the list experienced tax losses





































































Note: Calculations are based on the authors' data set consisting of 1,425 firms,
tabulations for 1984 exclude the Penn Central Company, for which no data were avail-
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Note: Firms are ranked by outstanding equity value at the end of 1983. The Alleghany
Corporation reported the presence of tax-purpose loss carryforwards, but it did not
report their amount.
tions and Turner Broadcasting, for example) appear because substantial
investment programs generated depreciation allowances significantly
greater than taxable earnings from current operations.
10.2.2 The Persistence of Tax-Loss Carryforwards
The extent to which the restricted loss-offset provisions in the cor-
poration tax affect investment and financing incentives depends upon
the duration of nontaxable spells. If firms with loss carryforwards can
expect to recover their taxable status within a year or two, then the
absence of loss-offset provisions will have relatively little effect on
incentives. If firms with carryforwards tend to be constrained for many
years, however, then they may face incentive effects which are sub-
stantially different from those of taxable firms.
We adopt two different approaches to analyzing the persistence of
tax-loss carryforwards. First, we use our data for the last four years
to fit simple Markov models for transitions into and out of the loss-
carryforward state. This provides the basis for our analysis of effective
tax rates in later sections, but it is limited by the fact that our data
span a period of only four years. Moreover, since these years include314 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
a very deep recession, transition probabilities from the recent period
may be unrepresentative of those confronting firms over a longer ho-
rizon. To obtain information on long-term persistence of loss carry-
forwards, we therefore perform the same calculations using a second
data source, the partially contaminated accounting loss-carryforward
data from COMPUSTAT, for the period 1968-84. These data are also
used to construct empirical distributions of the number of firms with
losses that persisted for one year, two years, three years, etc. Although
the differences between tax and book loss-carryforwards make these
tabulations an imperfect source of information on persistence, they do
permit us to compare the recent experience with that in prior years.
Table 10.4 reports summary statistics, based on our post-1981 data
sample, for transitions into and out of loss-carryforward status. The
top panel shows probabilities based on the first-order Markov as-
sumption, i.e., treating a firm's current status as containing all relevant
information about its transition prospects. These estimates show that
for the 1983-84 period, the probability of a firm without a loss car-
ryforward in period t experiencing one in period t + 1 is .026. For a

















No loss carryforward (/ - 1)
No loss carryforward (i) .977 .023
No loss carryforward (t - 1)
Loss carryforward (t) .099 .901
Loss carryforward (t — 1)
No loss carryforward (t) .680 .320
Loss carryforward (t - 1)
Loss carryforward (?) .083 .917
Note: All calculations are based on the authors' data set, described in the text, which
yields 2,849 firm years of data. The estimates are for transitions observed in 1983 and
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firm with a loss carryforward in period t, the probability of remaining
in the loss-carryforward state at t + 1 is .913.
In calculating simple Markov probabilities, we are implicitly assum-
ing that all firms have identical transition probabilities and that these
probabilities did not vary between 1983 and 1984. Neither assumption
is realistic, and these results should therefore be regarded as a simple
way of summarizing the data rather than as parameters of a structural
model of transition behavior.
There are two significant reasons why the transition probabilities are
likely to vary across firms: different firms have loss carryforwards of
different sizes, and there are probably differences in the stochastic
processes driving their taxable income streams. Auerbach (1983) es-
timates a model for tax status in which the firm's tax-loss carryforward
was modeled as a continuous variable. This requires imputing potential
carrybacks to firms with no loss carryforwards, and it also necessitates
complicated numerical integration in evaluating effective tax rates. The
Markov model used here yields great simplification in computing tax
incentives. Both procedures may be sensitive to missing information
about the vintages of carryforwards, since two firms with loss carry-
forwards of identical size, one with losses generated fifteen years ago
and the other with losses generated last year, have radically different
probabilities of escaping from the loss-carryforward state.
The second source of heterogeneity, potential differences in profit
processes, is more difficult to treat because it invalidates our assump-
tion of a simple Markov process. A firm's characteristics, including
lagged values of its loss-carryforward status, may affect its transition
probability.
8 We introduce some additional flexibility in our transition
matrix by estimating a second-order Markov process.
The results of estimating the second-order process are shown in the
second panel of table 10.4. We tested the assumption of a first-order
Markov process against the alternative of a second-order process (see
Anderson and Goodman [1957]) and rejected the first-order assumption
at the .10 level but not the .05 level. The x
2(2) statistic was 5.02, with
a .05 critical value of 5.99. We use the second-order process in later
sections to calculate effective tax rates.
Two important conclusions emerge from table 10.4. First, it is very
unlikely for a firm without a tax-loss carryforward to incur one. Second,
it is also unlikely for a firm with a tax-loss carryforward to "escape"
and become taxable again. These findings are important, because they
suggest that the burden of the tax code's asymmetry is not borne
uniformly, but rather falls heavily on the relatively few firms with tax-
loss carryforwards. This also implies that standard calculations of ef-
fective tax rates which neglect the role of loss carryforwards may
conceal important interfirm variations in tax incentives.316 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
The most significant drawback of our post-1981 data is that we cannot
examine the long-term persistence of tax-loss carryforwards. We can
address this issue using the data on accounting tax-loss carryforwards
drawn from the COMPUSTAT tape, however. To evaluate the potential
biases associated with these data, we compared their second-order
Markov transition probabilities for the 1983-84 period with those ob-
tained from our annual reports data. The probability that a firm with
two previous years of loss carryforward would remain in the loss-
carryforward state was .928 in the COMPUSTAT data, compared with
.917 in the annual reports data. The probability of remaining carryfor-
ward-free after two years of being currently taxable was .966 rather
than .977. The COMPUSTAT data therefore probably overstate the
persistence of tax losses because the chances of experiencing a tax loss
in a given year, for firms that have as well as those that have not
experienced them in the past, are higher in these data. This is consistent
with our finding that financial-purpose loss carryforwards, because they
include asset write-offs and other losses, may appear more significant
than the comparable tax-purpose losses. Nonetheless, the close agree-
ment between the COMPUSTAT and annual report-based data suggest
that valuable information can be obtained by studying COMPUSTAT
transition probabilities over time.
Table 10.5 presents the pattern of transition probabilities from the
COMPUSTAT sample. It reports our estimates of the four basic tran-
sition rates for each year between 1968 and 1984, as well as the prob-
abilities for the full sample period and two subsamples. Two conclu-
sions emerge. First, the probability that a firm with loss carryforwards
in the two previous years will experience another year of tax loss
increased substantially in 1981. We denote this probability as pLLL,
where the subscripts refer to the tax status in periods t—2, t—1, and
t, respectively. The subscript takes the value L for loss carryforward,
and Tfor currently taxable. The probability pLLL, which never exceeded
.90 in the years prior to 1980 and which was frequently below .80,
averages .928 since 1981. The probability of remaining in the loss po-
sition rises between 1981 and 1983, then declines in 1984, reflecting in
part changing business-cycle conditions. There is also a discontinuity
in 1981 in the probability that a firm which has experienced a taxable
year followed by a loss year will remain in the loss state, pTLL in our
notation. From a pre-1981 average of .787, pTLL changes to a post-1981
value of .909.
The table also shows a substantial post-1981 increase in the proba-
bility that a taxable firm will experience a loss carryforward. From .024
before 1981, pTLL increased by nearly 40% to .034. There is a smaller
increase in the chance that a firm which has experienced a loss-















































































































Note: Each column reports the transition probabilities calculated from the COMPUSTAT
data set of financial purpose tax-loss carryforwards.
These movements in the Markov transition probabilities correspond to
changes in the steady-state distribution of firms with respect to tax
status. The pre-1981 probabilities imply that in the steady state 10.9%
of all firms have tax-loss carryforwards. The comparable steady-state
value for the post-1981 probabilities is 33.5%, a striking increase.
9 This
undoubtedly overstates the long-run effect of the 1981 tax reform, since
it is difficult to disentangle the effects of the 1981 tax reform from the
post-1981 recession.
Our estimates of second-order Markov transition rates are incom-
plete because they shed no light on the behavior of firms that have
experienced losses for many periods. One way to study this long-term
persistence is by calculating the probability that a firm with a loss in
a particular year will experience losses for one more year, two more
years, etc. Table 10.6 presents calculations of these long-term transition
rates from the COMPUSTAT data sample for the period 1974-83.
1
0
The table shows that a significant fraction of firms that experience tax
losses in a given year will continue to have such losses for at least four
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over time, from .32 in 1974 to .50 in 1980, the last year for which it is
possible to calculate the four-year-later transition rate.
The estimates presented in this section are at best a rough charac-
terization of the transition probabilities confronting firms. In the next
two sections, we calculate effective tax rates for hypothetical firms
whose movements into and out of the tax-loss state are given by our
estimates. This analysis, which is primarily illustrative, demonstrates
the potentially important effect of loss-offset provisions on effective
tax rates.
10.3 The Incentive to Invest in the Presence of Tax Losses
Unlike more direct forms of investment subsidy, tax-loss carryfor-
wards are not likely to have uniform effects on different firms and asset
types. A firm with substantial unused tax benefits may appropriately
view itself as temporarily "tax exempt," while a firm with a small
carryforward which it expects to utilize during the next year regardless
of its current decisions should take no account of it in making invest-
ment decisions. The differences across asset types stem from differ-
ences in the timing of taxable income. Many assets, such as equipment
under current law, may be expected to generate negative taxable income
in their initial years. If a firm has unused tax benefits when the project
begins, this will decrease the asset's after-tax income. Since the ac-
cruing losses must be carried forward until the firm achieves a positive
tax liability, some investments may actually be discouraged by the
presence of unused tax benefits.
1
1 This section describes our meth-
odology for quantifying these incentive effects.
There are a number of approaches to measuring the impact of tax-
law asymmetries on investment incentives. Ideally, one would specify
a dynamic model of firm value maximization in which risky investment
would be affected by, and in turn would affect, the magnitude of unused
tax benefits present at different dates in different states of nature. This
problem is complicated by the joint endogeneity of investment and the
firm's tax status.
1
2 To make the problem more tractable, if less general,
one may restrict the endogeneity of either the firm's investment be-
havior or its tax status. The former approach is taken by Majd and
Myers (1985, 1986). They value the tax payments associated with risky
projects, taking account of the project's impact on the firm's future tax
status. Their approach highlights the interaction between the project's
risk and the risk of other random changes in the firm's tax status, but
it ignores potential changes in corporate behavior which may result
from variation in tax status.
An alternative approach, the one taken here, assumes that the prob-
ability distribution of future tax status is determined by the firm's320 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
history alone. This can be interpreted as treating the marginal invest-
ment project as small relative to the rest of the firm, so that the firm's
tax status is determined by the stochastic returns on its prior invest-
ments. The assumption that the probability distribution of tax status
is invariant with respect to marginal decisions is justified if this distri-
bution is the direct result of firm optimization decisions. This inter-
pretation highlights a shortcoming of this approach, however, in that
it is necessarily restricted to partial equilibrium analysis of changes in
tax rules or other components of the economic environment. We cannot
predict how a change in tax regime would affect the incentive to invest,
since it could both change the firm's statutory tax benefits holding its
investment decisions fixed and alter the probability distribution of its
future tax status.
10.3.1 Effective Tax Rates with Loss-Offset Limits
The summary statistic used throughout our analysis is the effective
tax rate on a marginal investment project, calculated as the percentage
difference between the internal rates of return on expected cash flows
before and after tax. We assume that these marginal investments are
inherently risk-free, and that the only source of uncertainty is the time
profile of future tax payments. We designate the project's before-tax
rate of return as p, which is set equal to .06 in all calculations. The
asset depreciates at a constant rate, 8, so an investment made at the
beginning of period O yields a gross return in period t of (p + 8)(1 — 8)'"'
per dollar of initial investment.
We assume that the investment tax credit and the first half-year
depreciation allowance accrue at date O. Thus, the firm's project-specific
accrued tax liability (Bt) at date t is:
- 8)'-» - Ad " 0'] t>0
0) \
[ t = 0
where T is the corporate tax rate, k the investment tax credit, Dt is the
nominal date t depreciation allowance, and / is the inflation rate. These
expressions describe an equity-financed project; with debt finance, in-
terest deductions would also enter the formula for Bt.
Under a symmetric tax system with full loss offset, equation (1)
would describe actual tax payments. The project's after-tax internal
rate of return, r, would be defined implicitly by the expression:
(2) -Bo + 2, (1 + r)-'[(p + 8)(1 - 8)'-> - Bt]
= 2 (1 + r)-'[(p + 8)(1 - 8)'-
1] - T(r) = 1
t=\321 Tax-Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives
where T(r) denotes the present value of tax payments computed using
discount rate r. After simplification, equation (2) yields the more fa-
miliar user cost of capital expression:
(3) p + 8 = (r + 8)(1 - k - TZV (1 - T).
We use z to denote the present value of depreciation allowances dis-
counted at r. The value of r which solves (2) is used to define the
effective tax rate:
(4) ETR = (p - r)/p
which is just the difference between the pretax and posttax rate of
return, measured as a fraction of the pretax return.
When the tax system imposes limitations on the deduction of losses,
actual tax payments may differ from Bt. This requires us to amend
equation (2) before r and the effective tax rate can be calculated. Each
accrued tax liability gives rise to a distribution of expected tax pay-
ments, since the firm may not be taxable when the tax liability or benefit
accrues. In some states of nature, the firm will be taxable in period t
and the accruing tax, Bt, can then be realized immediately. If the firm
has a tax-loss carryforward and Bt is positive, its loss carryforward
will be reduced and the firm will experience an increase in its tax
payments in the year when it exhausts its carryforward and becomes
taxable. If Bt is negative, loss carryforwards will increase and there
will be a reduction in the firm's tax payments in the (future) year when
the firm begins paying taxes again.
To describe the distribution of tax payments corresponding to a tax
accrual in period /, we need some notation. We define ir£/r to be the
probability that a firm with a loss carryforward in year t returns to
being taxable in year t + s. The subscripts denote the firm's tax status
in the years beginning in year t, and a T subscript indicates a taxable
year while an L indicates a year with a loss carryforward.
1
3 Thus,
Tt'LT is the probability that a firm with a loss carryforward in year t will
become taxable in the next year. Both ITILT- and TX
1L2T represent the
probability that a firm with a loss carryforward in period t will remain
nontaxable for one more period, and then return to current taxable
status two periods in the future. These probabilities, which we will
ultimately derive from our Markov transition parameters, enable us to
compute the expected tax payments corresponding to a tax accrual in
period t.
Our analysis so far has omitted two important features of the tax
system. First, since there are limits on the number of years (AT) an
accrued tax payment can be carried forward, the distribution of tax
payments from an accrual at / will be truncated after t + N. Second,
we have ignored the role of loss carrybacks. Once carrybacks are
permitted, each expected tax payment increases the firm's potential322 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
ability to subsequently carry back future tax losses. We will use vts to
denote the shadow value of additional tax payments in year t + s,
viewed from the perspective of year t. With these complications, the
present expected value of tax payments, T, becomes
f
The term in brackets is the expected present value of a one-dollar tax
accrual in period t. Equation (5) defines T{r), which can in turn be




10.3.2 Computing the Time Distribution of Tax Payments
To implement these effective tax-rate calculations, we need the prob-
ability distribution of tax payment dates for each accrued tax liability.
We compute these distributions from the second-order transition prob-
abilities in tables 10.5 and 10.6. These calculations are facilitated if we
introduce new variables corresponding to the probability that a firm is
in each of the four possible states, TT, TL, LT, and LL, in a given
period. We use q\j to represent these probabilities. For a firm which is
known to have a tax loss in the period before, and period of, a new
investment, q°LL = 1 and q°LT = q\L = q\j = 0. In general, the prob-
ability that a firm will be taxable in period one is
(6) TX\ = qiT + q
xrr =(q°LLPLLT + QTLPTLT) + (irrPTTT +
The second part of the equation shows how the year-one probabilities
can be built up recursively from the starting conditions, the qfj, and
the transition probabilities that were discussed in the last section. Sim-
ilar calculations permit us to derive the probabilities of finding the firm
in other tax states in period one.
The probability that the firm will carry its taxes from the investment
year forward exactly one period is TT£J = qriPrLT + QILPLLT- Parallel
calculations show that the unconditional probability of carrying taxes
forward for two years or more is TT^X = qriPTLL + QLLPLLL, and the
probability of carrying a loss forward for exactly two years is TT^LT =
PLLT^LL- Probabilities corresponding to longer carryforwards can also
be calculated recursively.
While these calculations have considered the distribution of tax ac-
cruals from period zero, it is straightforward to apply this approach to
compute the distribution of tax payments corresponding to accruals
later in the project's life. The initial conditions are just the {q$ cor-
responding to the firm's probabilities of being in each tax state at the
beginning of period t. These can be calculated recursively from the323 Tax-Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives
$ and the transition probabilities as in equation (6). As we iterate
forward, however, the firm's tax status in year zero becomes less im-
portant as a predictor of its period / status, and the TT vector converges
to a steady-state value. In practice, we truncate our calculated IT vector




We incorporate loss carryforwards by assuming that all deferred tax
payments may be carried forward N years, where N is the statutory
maximum for carrying losses forward.
1
6 Incorporating carrybacks is
more complicated, since the opportunity to carry losses back has the
effect of making every tax payment potentially valuable in facilitating
the accelerated deduction of future tax losses. This imparts a shadow
value to tax payments; we calculate this shadow value in two stages.
First, we compute a distribution of expected tax payments under the
assumption that there are no carrybacks. Then, we account for car-
rybacks by reducing each dollar of estimated tax payments by a shadow
value which depends upon the firm's current tax status and the esti-
mated transition probabilities. The calculation of the carryback shadow
value is described in greater detail in the Appendix.
10.3.3 Qualifications
All of the analysis in this section presumes that the effective tax
rates which apply to a firm's investment choices are a function of its
own tax status. This need not be the case. Leasing arrangements are
one example of a channel through which the effective tax rates of the
firms using and owning an asset can be separated. These institutions
have been particularly popular in some of the industries with a signif-
icant incidence of tax losses, such as airlines. It is important to realize,
however, that although leasing can reduce the present value of tax
payments for a constrained firm, its impact on the firm's incentive to
invest in new capital is less clear. A firm that has a loss carryforward
would be better off if it could utilize this tax benefit right away, since
the tax benefit loses value over time and may expire. Given that the
firm cannot use this tax benefit, however, it may be encouraged to
invest more, since additional taxable income generated by new in-
vestment will enable it to offset part of the loss carryforward.
A second limitation inherent to our analysis is its exclusive focus on
tax policies. For some of the large firms that have tax-loss carryfor-
wards, taxation is just one of the many ways in which the government
and the firm interact. Examples of other policies that clearly affect the
performance of the firms and the welfare of their shareholders include
direct loan guarantees, regulation (especially for airlines and railroads),
tariff policy, and in some cases government purchasing policy. Ana-324 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
lyzing changes in tax rules without considering the offsetting changes
which might occur in the other policy instruments is necessarily
incomplete.
10.4 Empirical Results
This section presents numerical calculations illustrating how tax losses
affect investment incentives. We consider general industrial equipment
and industrial buildings, and estimate the effective tax rates associated
with each under the tax regimes of 1965, 1975, and 1985. We then
explore the sensitivity of these tax rates under current law to changes
in both the tax code and the economic environment.
10.4.1 Changes in Effective Tax Rates over Time
In 1965, the corporate tax rate was .48 and the investment tax credit,
which was available only on equipment, was 0.07 with no basis ad-
justment. The equipment class could be written off over twelve years
using the double-declining balance method with an optimal switch to
straight-line, while structures received the same treatment over twenty-
nine years. Tax losses could be carried forward for five years and back
for three.
By 1975, the ITC on equipment had been raised to 0.10 and, due to
the introduction of the Asset Depreciation Range System, equipment
could be written off in ten years. In addition, structures had been
restricted to using the 150% declining-balance method. The corporate
tax rate was still .48, and the carryforward and carryback provisions
were the same as those in 1965.
Through tax changes in 1978, 1981, 1982, 1984, and 1985, equipment
in 1985 received a 10% ITC with 50% basis adjustment and depreciation
over five years following the pattern established by the Accelerated
Cost Recovery System (ACRS). Structures could be written off over
nineteen years through the use of the 175% declining-balance method
with switchover to straight-line. In 1981, the carryforward period for
losses was increased to fifteen years. The statutory corporate tax rate
in 1985 was .46.
1
7
We estimate the pattern of before-tax cash flows for each asset,
assuming that the before-tax rate of return, net of depreciation, is 6%
and that the asset depreciates at the rate estimated by Hulten and
Wykoff (1981): 3.61 % per year for buildings, 12.25% per year for equip-
ment. We set the inflation rate at 4% throughout our calculations, and




A firm's tax burden is critically dependent on the vector of proba-
bilities describing the number of years that will elapse before its first325 Tax-Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives
passage into currently taxable status. Using the transition probabilities
estimated for the COMPUSTAT sample in the 1968-84 period, we
calculate this vector for two hypothetical firms. The first has just ex-
perienced its second consecutive year of tax losses (qLL = 1), while
the second is "the representative firm" in the sense that it has prob-
abilities of being in states LL, LT, TL, and TT corresponding to the
steady state of the Markov process.
Table 10.7 shows the IT vectors for each of these firms. The IT vector
reports the probability that each firm will experience tax-loss spells of
different lengths. The low probability of switching states leads very
little of the representative firm's weight to be in states TL or LT. In
the steady state, 83.2% of firms are taxable in both the current and the
previous year, while 12.1% of firms have had tax-loss carryforwards
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Note: All calculations are based on average transition probabilities from the full-sample
1968-84 COMPUSTAT data file. The first column reports the ir' vector for a firm that
reports a tax-loss carryforward in periods t and t — 1. The second column shows the
analogous TT' vector for a firm which has the steady-state probabilities of being in each
state: TT with 82.9% probability, TL and LT each with 2.5% probability, and LL with
12.1% probability. See text for further details.326 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
will accrue to firms that can deduct them immediately.
1
9 Firms that are
nontaxable remain nontaxable for long periods, however. A firm with
tax losses in the previous two years is more likely than not to wait at
least four years until paying a currently accruing tax liability.
Table 10.8 presents our effective tax-rate calculations for the years
1965, 1975, and 1985 based on the assumption that each asset is entirely
equity-financed. The table shows the general trend toward reduced
effective tax rates on equipment over this time period, with the ETR
for a taxable firm falling from 27.5% in 1965 to -5.0% in 1985. The
dramatic reductions in the ETRs for taxable firms are, however, not
reflected in the ETRs for tax-loss carryforward firms, where the re-
duction is from 30.8% in 1965 to 15.0% in 1985. For structures, the
differences between taxable firms and loss-carryforward firms are much
smaller. This is of course due to the much longer lifetime of these
assets, and the consequent tendency for initial differences in tax status
to be damped out over the project horizon.
2
0
The effect of asymmetric treatment of gains and losses on effective
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Note: All calculations assume an inflation rate of .04 and a pretax return to capital of
.06. For equipment, 8 = .1225 and for structures, 8 = .0361. We employ the 1968-84
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postpones all tax liabilities, but especially the earliest ones, which may
be negative. The latter effect is most important for equipment, where
the currently taxable firm faces a much lower effective tax rate than
the loss-carryforward firm. The impact on structures, for which im-
mediate tax benefits are smaller, is in the opposite direction.
The results also confirm the common view that tax losses prevent
firms from receiving the full incentive to invest intended by increases
in accelerated depreciation and the investment tax credit over recent
years. While holding inflation at 4%, the hypothetical firm under sym-
metric taxation had its effective tax rate on equipment reduced by 33.4
percentage points in the last two decades. The taxable firm enjoyed a
similar decline of 32.5 percentage points, but the reduction was just
15.8 percentage points for the nontaxable firm. It therefore received
less than half of the full statutory benefit.
Our earlier results suggesting the high concentration of tax-loss firms
in a few industries also indicate that previous estimates of effective tax
rates by industry may be misleading.
2
1 For steel, airlines, and auto-
mobiles, for example, it is essential to recognize that a substantial
fraction of firms have tax-loss carryforwards and therefore face effec-
tive tax rates different from those facing taxable firms. In these indus-
tries, there are also likely to be important interfirm differences in ef-
fective tax rates due to variation in corporate histories and tax status.
Our algorithm also computes the shadow value of carrybacks and
the value of a dollar of accruing tax losses for a firm that has just
entered the untaxed state. For 1965 and 1975, when the carryforward
period was five years, the shadow value of a carryback to a firm that
had been taxable for two years was .040; for a firm that had been
nontaxable in the previous year and was taxable in the current year,
this value was .072. The expected present value of a dollar of currently
accruing losses to a firm that had just incurred a tax-loss carryforward
for the first time was .479 dollars. In 1985, with the longer period for
carrying losses forward, these three parameters were respectively .026,
.044, and .661.
The magnitude of the carryback shadow values suggest the limited
usefulness of current carryback provisions. This is because most losses
accrue to firms that experience several years of losses, and because
most future losses will be recovered through the carryforward provi-
sion. Allowing firms the option of carrying losses back typically ac-
celerates the recognition of tax benefits but does not enable the firm
to claim tax benefits that would otherwise have expired unused. By
contrast, the length of carryforward provision does appear to have a
substantial effect on the expected value of a dollar of accruing tax
losses. The longer carryforward period in 1985 both raises the value
of a marginal dollar of carryforwards and lowers the value of the car-328 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
rybacks, since accelerating the recovery of a tax loss is less critical
with the expiration constraint relaxed.
10.4.2 Sensitivity of Effective Tax Rates
Our results in table 10.8 may actually underestimate the dispersion
of effective tax rates facing corporations. Table 10.9 presents calcu-
lations for a number of alternative assumptions about economic con-
ditions, corporate behavior, and tax policy. The second row of each
panel shows the effect of an inflation shock that raises the inflation
rate from .04 to .10. This causes a large jump in all of the calculated
effective tax rates, the largest for taxable firms investing in equipment.
The effective tax rate rises by more in each case for currently taxable
than for nontaxable firms. This is because loss-carryforward firms are
Table 10.9 Sensitivity of Effective Tax Rates to Alternative Assumptions
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Note: The baseline case corresponds to the 1985 law in table 10.8. Maintained assumptions
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already receiving their depreciation allowances at later dates than cur-
rently taxable firms. This reduces the contribution of the depreciation
allowances to the project's present value, and hence lowers the sen-
sitivity of the effective tax rate to inflation shocks, which further erode
the value of these allowances.
The third row of each panel shows the effective corporate tax rate,
net of interest deductions, when investments support real interest pay-
ments equal to a historically typical 10% of before-tax investment re-
turns. With the addition of interest deductions, the value of being
taxable increases, particularly as inflation rises. The use of partial debt-
finance lowers the expected corporate tax bill, although its effect on
total corporate and individual tax payments is probably smaller given
the individual tax advantage to holding equity. It is of greatest benefit
for taxable firms. The effective tax rate reductions for equipment and
structures are 15.0 and 12.5 percentage points for the firm with no
losses in the last two years, compared to 10.0 and 10.9 points for the
firm with two consecutive loss years and 16.6 and 14.1 points for the
firm facing perfect loss-offsets. Overall, the addition of this moderate
level of interest expense amplifies the advantage of being taxable. The
effective tax rates on structures are very close, while taxable firms
enjoy a substantial advantage in equipment. If interest deductions are
taken into account, being nontaxable probably discourages marginal
investment and induces a shift away from equipment investment.
The last two sets of calculations in table 10.9 consider the impact of
altering the tax provisions regarding the loss carryforwards themselves.
The first set estimates the effect of permitting unlimited carryforwards,
while the second examines the impact of eliminating the ability to carry
losses back. Our earlier calculations suggested that increasing the time
limit on the use of tax losses from five to fifteen years in 1981 sub-
stantially increased the expected present value of a dollar of loss car-
ryforwards. Extending the limit beyond fifteen years appears to be less
important. For taxable firms, the effective tax rates on both equipment
and structures are only changed in the second decimal place, and for
equipment there is a small (0.8 percentage point) change in the effective
tax rate for nontaxable firms as a result of allowing unlimited carry-
forwards. Similarly, disallowing carrybacks has a relatively small im-
pact. The largest change in an effective tax rate is for structures, where
the ETR on a nontaxable firm rises 1.6 percentage points and that for
a taxable firm increases 1.2 points. Both types of firms experience
smaller effects on the effective tax rate for equipment. Structures are
more affected because the chance of a firm having an opportunity to
use a loss-carryback provision is substantially greater due to the asset's
longer life.330 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
The pattern of ETR changes associated with carryback and carry-
forward reforms underscores the interaction between these provisions.
Eliminating carrybacks raises the effective tax rate on all assets except
equipment investment by taxable firms, where the ETR declines.
Equipment investments initially had a negative effective tax rate, and
the ETR becomes more negative. All of the other asset/firm status
combinations had positive ETRs, and they become more positive. This
is because eliminating carrybacks raises the shadow cost of tax pay-
ments and lowers the shadow value of tax benefits. When carrybacks
are permitted, the firm's shadow cost of a tax payment is less than the
actual payment because it may be used to carry back future losses.
Eliminating carrybacks removes this option, and thereby raises the
present value of the tax payments for all assets with initial positive tax
rates. Since tax payments are now more costly, those assets with mostly
positive tax payments are reduced in value. By comparison, the value
of those assets with net tax benefits (i.e., equipment purchased by a
currently taxable firm) increases, because the shadow value of receiving
a tax deduction has also increased. This reduces still further the neg-
ative effective tax rates.
Allowing for unlimited carryforwards has no noticeable effect on any
effective tax rate except that for nontaxable firms investing in equip-
ment, where the effective tax rate rises. This occurs even though the
firm carrying losses forward will be better off with an extension of the
time limit, because positive marginal tax payments that otherwise might
have been entirely avoided may now have to be made.
The results in this section have all been derived using the average
transition probabilities estimated over the 1968-84 period. These suffer
from several drawbacks, as suggested in the second section. Table 10.10
reports the baseline current-law effective tax rate and sensitivity cal-
culations using the second-order transition probabilities estimated for
the 1981-84 period. The results are strikingly similar to those in table
10.9, with the one significant exception being the effective tax rate on
structures for firms with tax-loss carryforwards. Using the full-sample
probabilities, this effective tax rate was 39.2%. In table 10.10, it is only
24.2%. The difference arises because, using the post-1981 transition
probabilities, a firm with two years of loss carryforwards has a greater
chance (.913) of remaining in the untaxed state than under the full-
sample probabilities (.830). This increases the persistence of tax-loss
carryforwards and raises the probability that a loss firm will defer the
tax payments on the structure's earnings, as well as the (less important)
depreciation allowances. This deferral reduces the effective tax rate.
There are other minor differences between the results in tables 10.9
and 10.10. When the post-1981 probabilities are used, the equipment331 Tax-Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives
Table 10.10 Sensitivity of Effective Tax Rates to Alternative Assumptions
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Note: Maintained assumptions are the same as those in table 10.9 except that we use
the transition probabilities from table 10.4 rather than those from table 10.5.
ETR for a firm with tax-loss carryforwards is 8.3%, compared with
15.0% if the full-sample probabilities describe the transition matrix.
The loss-carryforward firms are also much less sensitive to the inflation
rate under the post-1981 probabilities, primarily because the chance
that these firms will ever return to taxable status is lower, and so the
present value of the tax allowances, the part of the calculation which
is sensitive to the inflation rate, is much reduced.
10.5 Conclusions
This paper has explored the recent incidence of tax-loss carryfor-
wards amongst nonfinancial corporations. Fifteen percent of all firms332 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
report loss carryforwards. There are, however, some industries in which
losses are being carried forward by a significant fraction of firms, and
where current loss-offset restrictions significantly affect corporate tax
incentives.
A firm's tax status is a key determinant of its investment incentives.
For firms with tax-loss carryforwards, effective tax rates on plant and
equipment may be significantly different from those for taxable firms
that are able to utilize tax deductions as they accrue. For equipment
investments under 1985 law, taxable firms face lower effective tax rates
than do firms with loss carryforwards. The opposite is true for struc-
tures. These findings, coupled with the concentration of losses in some
industries, suggest that previous attempts to estimate interindustry dif-
ferences in effective tax rates neglect an important source of tax-rate
variation. The differences between firms in the same industry, de-
pending on their current tax status, may be even more substantial.
Our calculations may understate the economic importance of tax-
loss carryforwards for several reasons. First, as we emphasize in the
text, aggregate evidence suggests that tax losses are substantially more
prevalent than our estimates imply. Second, we have modeled the in-
centive effects assuming that all firms face the economy-wide proba-
bilities of transiting between taxable and nontaxable states. If some
firms have precise knowledge about the pattern of tax liabilities they
are likely to face, this may induce much larger swings in their invest-
ment and financial behavior as they take advantage of intertemporal
changes in marginal tax rates. Third, our calculations of the incidence
of loss carryforwards may not reflect the steady state to which the
economy will move if the post-1981 depreciation schedule had remained
in effect. Since the presence of highly accelerated depreciation allow-
ances increases the chance that firms will generate tax losses, there
could have been long-term shifts in the fractions of taxable and non-
taxable firms.
Data limitations preclude us from considering firms with tax-credit
carryforwards. Although many of the loss-carryforward firms in our
sample also report either investment or foreign tax-credit carryfor-
wards, there may also be substantial numbers of firms with credit
carryforwards but no loss carryforwards. For these firms, the marginal
tax rate on additional income may be substantially different from the
statutory marginal tax rate. By omitting them, we understate the im-
portance of firms whose marginal tax rates deviate from statutory val-
ues. Altshuler and Auerbach (1987) present a more complex model
which addresses this issue.
Our effective tax rate calculations embody a number of strong as-
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firms. In particular, we maintain the fiction that firms face identical,
time-invariant, exogenous probabilities of moving into and out of pe-
riods during which tax losses are carried forward. Each of these as-
sumptions is unrealistic and could usefully be relaxed in future work.
Perhaps the most intriguing direction for future work concerns the
endogeneity of a firm's tax status. There are a wide range of corporate
actions that affect marginal tax rates, ranging from the traditional in-
vestment and financing choices (see Cooper and Franks [1983] and
Auerbach [1986]) to less frequently analyzed accounting choices (see
Watts and Zimmerman [1986]). We know relatively little about what
firms do in both the real and the financial domains in order to alter
their tax status. The potential response of these corporate decisions
are fundamental for analyzing the incentive effects of the corporate
tax.
The substantial differences across firms in expected future tax-status
may provide a useful source of variation that can be used to study how
taxes affect financing and investment decisions. If the magnitude of
debt tax shields are an important influence on the capital structure of
firms, as in DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), then we should observe
different borrowing policies from firms with substantial tax-loss carry-
forwards and those that have large accumulated potential carrybacks
and are currently taxable. Firms of the latter kind have a larger tax
incentive for borrowing than do those of the former, and this may yield
testable predictions of how taxes affect financing choices.
Finally, we can speculate about how the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(passed after the first version of this paper was completed) will affect
the incidence and impact of tax losses. The new law changes several
provisions affecting firms with tax losses. First, it scales back invest-
ment incentives and thereby lowers the chance that high-growth firms
undertaking substantial investment programs will experience tax losses.
At the same time, firms with tax loss carryforwards will face smaller
disincentives to invest in machinery and equipment (relative to struc-
tures) because equipment investments will no longer yield substantial
amounts of negative taxable income in their early years. These effects
imply that inter-firm differentials in investment incentives, as well as
inter-asset differentials for firms with losses, are reduced by the new
law. These contributions to "levelling the playing field" were not usu-
ally recognized in discussions of the new bill.
A final provision in the new law affects the extent to which firms
can utilize tax loss carryforwards through merger. Prior to the 1986
Act, tax loss carryforwards from a target firm could, provided certain
conditions were met, be utilized immediately. The new law reduces the
rate at which the stock of loss carryforwards from the target can be334 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
applied to reduce the tax liability of the acquirer: no more than 7% of
the transferred stock of losses can be utilized in any year. There are
also new restrictions on the preservation of NOL carryforwards when
a company is reorganized in a bankruptcy. Although our analysis has
not discussed any of these provisions in detail, they all have a common
effect in making tax losses less valuable for firms that have them. The
new legislation restricts the alternatives available for a firm trying to
utilize a stock of losses. It will increase the incentives to undertake
investments that will yield taxable cash flows.
Appendix
Computing the Shadow Value of Tax Payments
with Carrybacks
This appendix describes our procedure for calculating the shadow value
of tax payments, a value that arises from their possible future use in
permitting loss carrybacks. A dollar of tax payments is valuable be-
cause, according to current law, it may be used to offset a tax loss
occurring in the following three years. However, its value is less than
the present value of such deductions because there is some probability
that the loss that is made deductible in the next three years would have
been offset through carryforwards at some future date. Tax losses for-
gone in future periods also have a shadow value because the associated
increase in taxable income will in turn lead to the possibility of eventual
carryback.
To compute the value of the carryback option, consider a taxable
firm and define v^ as the expected carryback value of a one-dollar tax
payment made in the second of a pair of adjacent taxable years. Define
vLT in parallel fashion. Let corL denote the present value of the future
deductions forgone when a loss is realized; it,is also the present value
of the tax payments which result from a one-dollar increase in taxable
income for a firm that was taxable in the previous year but is currently
not taxable. This follows from the fact that a carryback is used as soon
as possible, which means the first year in which there is insufficient
taxable income. The value of vTT is given by:
(A.I)
 Vrr
 = $PTTL + P
= PPTTJI + &PTTT
where (3 = (1 — i)l{\ + r) denotes the discount factor applied when
shifting a tax payment one year into the future. Equation (A. 1) denotes335 Tax-Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives
the expected present value of the carrybacks associated with a one-
dollar tax payment. By the same logic, we can define
(A.2) vLT = [$pLTL + PPLTTPTTL + $
3PLTTPTTTPTTL\ (1 ~ <*TL)
for currently taxable firms that were not taxable last year. Each of these
expressions depends upon <orz,, which is in turn given by
(A.3) <X>TL = PrLrPO ~ vLr) + pTLLpLLT$
2(l - vLT)
(1 ~ vLT)
where N is the maximum number of periods for which a loss may be
carried forward. Solving these three equations for v^, vLT, and
yields:
(A.4) v-n = [aT7{\ - arj]/(l - aL1a.TL)
(A.5) vLT = [OLL7(\ - aTL)]l{\ - aLJaTl)
(A.6) (x)TL = [a^O - aLT)]/(\ - aLJ<xTL). 2
where <*„ = $Prrdl + $PTTT + PPTTTL OLLT = $pLTL +
+ ^PLTTPTTIPTTL, and aTL = (1 - vLT)[$pTLT + $
2PTLLPLLT + . . . +
$
NPTLIPLLTPLLLI
These shadow values are used in calculating the expected present
value of tax liabilities. To account for firms' ability to carry losses back,
we multiply each of the expected tax payments generated by the no-
carryback analysis by either (1 - v^) or (1 - vLT), depending on the
firm's tax status. When a firm accrues a tax liability with a distribution
of expected payments across many periods, the concurrent value of
qrr determines the fraction of the expected tax payment that will be
paid immediately in a state following a taxable year. This amount is
multiplied by (1 - v-u). All of the remaining components associated
with this accrued liability are multiplied by (1 - vLT), since they occur
in states where the firm will have just reentered taxable status. In the
notation of section 10.3 this implies
vLT s > t
+ ^LTVLTV((1TT + (JLT) s = t.
(A.7) v,, =
This can be substituted into equation (5) to evaluate the internal rate
of return, r, and then the effective tax rate.
Notes
1. Cordes and Sheffrin (1983) calculate marginal tax rates using corporate
tax-return data but they assume that firms cannot carry back either losses or336 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
credits. This biases their findings toward the result that many firms face tax
rates below the statutory maximum.
2. For an excellent summary of the recent debate surrounding average tax
rates on large corporations, see the series of essays in Tax Notes 9 December
1985. The claim that sizable numbers of large corporations pay no tax is from
Mclntyre and Folen (1984) and Mclntyre and Wilhelm (1986). Their calculations
are based on the ratio of current tax payments to earnings, which bears little
necessary relation to the firm's marginal tax status.
3. The extent to which firms can claim investment tax credits, foreign tax
credits, R and D credits, and a number of other credits depends upon their
taxable income. The ITC, for example, is limited to $25,000 + .90*max
[0,Tax — 25,000]. Additional taxable earnings for a firm bound by this constraint
would raise tax liability by only .10*T, where T is the statutory tax rate.
4. Cordes and Sheffrin (1983) were affiliated with the Office of Tax Analysis
when they used the Treasury Corporate Tax Model to calculate the distribution
of corporate marginal tax rates.
5. We also tried to find examples of loss-carryforward firms that did not
appear in the COMPUSTAT sample. For example, we examined the 50 firms
with the smallest current tax payments in Mclntyre and Folen (1984) and found
no cases of firms with loss carryforwards that were not in our sample.
6. Stickney, Weil, and Wolfson (1983) provide a detailed analysis of the
accounting by one firm, General Electric, for its financial subsidiary.
7. It is difficult to gauge the importance of omitting the financial subsidiaries
of some firms. We studied the published financial statements of several large
financial subsidiaries, those of General Motors, Chrysler, General Electric,
Ford, and Westinghouse, and in no case did we find evidence of tax-loss car-
ryforwards in the subsidiary; this suggests that the biases from annual reports
which exclude these subsidiaries may not be too severe.
8. Although in principle we could model firm heterogeneity and estimate
separate transition probabilities for firms with similar characteristics, the
sparseness of some off-diagonal cells in our transition matrices suggests that
it would be difficult to obtain precise estimates. For example, there are only
14 firms which make the taxable-loss carryforward-taxable transition in 1983-
84, and only 20 firms in the loss carryforward-taxable-taxable cell. Another
possibility is using a mover-stayer model to describe the data, allowing some
firms to be "stayers" in the taxable state. This might be explored in future
work.
9. The steady-state probabilities are defined as follows: qLL = qL1{\ -
PTLTVPLLT, QLT = QTL = W + PLTT^O - Pm) + (1 - PTLTVPLLT], and q^ =
QTLPLT^(\ - PTTT)-
10. The transition probabilities in this table are not directly comparable to
those in table 10.5 for two reasons. First, in looking at COMPUSTAT data
over a period of many years, we confront the problem of missing values for
the tax-loss variables. We assume (very conservatively) that all missing values
correspond to taxable years; this substantially overstates the chance of escap-
ing from the tax-loss state. Second, the sample selection problem alluded to
in the text with respect to firms which merged or went bankrupt is likely to
be much more important in this analysis of transitions over a long time-period
than in our previous tabulations, which spanned only four years. The net effect
of this bias is unclear.
11. An asset need not have a negative total tax liability for this to occur.
Consider a project with negative taxable earnings in its early years, followed337 Tax-Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives
by significant taxable income later in its life. Even if the project's tax payments
have a positive net present value, the cost of forgoing tax benefits in the near
term may exceed the gain from postponing tax liabilities later in the project.
12. Previous work treating this endogeneity has considered only very simple
models; see, for example, Auerbach (1986).
13. The notation L
s refers to s consecutive years of tax-loss carryforwards.
14. By focusing on expected returns, we are implicitly assuming that tax-
status risk is entirely nonsystematic. In practice, most firms are more likely
to experience tax-loss carryforwards during recessions; this imparts a poten-
tially important systematic component to these tax streams.
15. We also truncate project returns and accrued tax liabilities after forty
years. The results are insensitive to these truncations.
16. This overstates the effect of carryforward provisions. When a nontaxable
firm incurs a tax liability, there are two possibilities concerning its current
income: it may be negative, adding to previous losses, or it may be positive
but completely offset by previous losses. In the former case, the additional tax
liability (if negative) will add new losses to be carried forward. If the additional
tax liability is positive, it will reduce the new losses carried forward. In either
case, the tax liability will have a limit of fifteen years during which it can be
realized. After that time, the marginal impact on the stock of loss carryforwards
disappears. In the case where the firm is currently offsetting some of its pre-
vious tax losses, however, the situation is more complicated, since the marginal
impact of the accrued tax liabilities will be to increase or decrease the working
off of old loss carryforwards. The marginal contribution of a new gain or loss
to the tax losses carried forward therefore has fewer than N years to expiration.
17. An additional restriction which has been changed over the years governs
the extent to which firms can use investment tax credits to offset taxable income
before credits. To model this provision, we would have to modify our analysis
to include an intermediate state between taxable and nontaxable, in which a
firm pays taxes but has tax credits carried forward. Unfortunately, because
our data limitations prevent us from estimating transition probabilities with
respect to this state, we must omit it.
18. Ideally, the rate used to discount the components in the carryback shadow
price would be the after-tax rate of return for the project. However, this would
have required an iteration procedure which seemed inappropriate given the
parameter's minor role.
19. This fraction undoubtedly overstates the share of taxable firms in the
population as a whole, since we generate smaller estimates of aggregate tax
losses than the IRS tabulations suggest.
20. We assume that when structures are purchased they are depreciated only
once. Gordon, Hines, and Summers (1987) conclude that "churning" is not
profitable for corporations, although it may be attractive to partnerships. We
also ignore asset-related differences in leverage capacity. If structures can carry
more debt than equipment, as is commonly supposed, then loss-carryforward
firms may face greater disincentives to purchasing structures than we have
reported.
21. For examples of previous calculations of industry-specific ETRs, see
Auerbach (1983), Fullerton (1985), or Fullerton and Henderson (1984).338 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
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Comment David F. Bradford
Economists have often noted the consequences for incentives to invest
that follow from the nonrefundability of the corporation income tax.
As we usually model it, a firm that shows a current loss on its tax
books is unable to take advantage of the deduction of depreciation
allowances (or of other deductions, such as interest payments, for that
matter)—a disincentive to invest. On the other hand, for a firm that
expects to have a tax-loss position in the future, the positive payoff
from an incremental project undertaken in the present may be reaped
free of tax, giving an extra boost to investment incentives. Examples
can readily be constructed of large variation in incentives according to
the tax-loss position of the firm.
It is another matter to determine the practical importance of these
variations, the project undertaken here by Auerbach and Poterba. As
the authors convincingly explain, the task is more daunting than one
might have expected. This is partly because data on the occurrence of
tax-loss carryforwards are buried in tax returns that are not accessible
to the public. It is also because the tax law is complex, as are the
options available to the firm to deal with the situation. I shall comment
on the approaches Auerbach and Poterba took to both the observational
and the analytical difficulties.
A loss in a given year, understood as a negative amount of income
calculated according to the usual tax rules, can be carried back and
applied against positive levels of the tax base ("income") in the pre-
vious three years. For these cases, the tax is, in effect, refundable. To
be unable to use currently negative taxable income to save on current
taxes, the firm must be in a "tax-loss carryforward" position. In this
situation, the firm cannot take an immediate deduction against taxable
income but may carry the loss forward to apply it against profits any
time in the next fifteen years. The divergence here from refundability
derives in part from the possibility that there will be insufficient positive
income during the next fifteen years and in part from the time value
of money: saving a dollar of taxes in the future is worth less than saving
a dollar now.
The major empirical undertaking in this paper is to analyze the ex-
perience of actual firms. Since tax-return data, other than on a highly
aggregated basis, are not available, the authors have applied their in-
genuity to uncovering substitutes. Firms do report some information
David F. Bradford is the associate dean of the Woodrow Wilson School and professor
of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University, and a research associate of
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about their tax situations in annual reports and 10-K filings with the
SEC. Unfortunately, the most readily available collected set of data
from corporate accounts, the COMPUSTAT data base, reports tax-loss
carryforwards on a different basis than do tax accounts. Actual annual
reports and/or 10-K statements include data that come closer than do
those reported on the COMPUSTAT tape to providing tax-loss carry-
forwards according to tax accounting conventions, but the figures must
be collected from each firm for each year individually. The authors
have therefore organized an army of research assistants to collect fig-
ures from these decentralized sources. These data are used both on
their own, for the evidence they provide about the significance of tax-
loss carryforward status, and as the basis for assessing the reason-
ableness of results obtained by using COMPUSTAT data as though
they were true tax data.
Auerbach and Poterba's principal empirical finding is that loss-
carryforward status is rather persistent. Transition probabilities esti-
mated on the basis of individually collected data for 1983 and 1984
suggest that a firm with no loss carryforward in a year has a probability
of 97.4% of being in the same position the next year and a firm with a
loss carryforward has a probability of 91.3% of carrying a loss forward
again in the next year. The second-order transition data indicate that
the probability that a firm that has had two "good" years (i.e., has
avoided tax-loss carryforward status for two successive years, years
that could have had negative taxable income before loss carryback)
will at least not have such a bad next year as to drop into tax-loss
carryforward status is 97.7%; a firm with two past bad years will have
another one (i.e., insufficient positive profit to soak up past loss car-
ryforwards) with a probability of 91.7%. (All these figures are from
table 10.4.)
Two problems should be noted about the data supporting Auerbach-
Poterba's empirical findings. They may in part explain the finding that
the aggregate of loss carryforwards in the authors' sample is substan-
tially below aggregate estimates based on IRS data. One problem they
point out themselves: there are divergences between the particular way
divisions of firms are consolidated for tax and annual report purposes.
They do not attempt to assess the importance of the resulting bias. I
do not know how the accounts are kept. It seems implausible that the
unit chosen for financial reporting purposes calculates a hypothetical
taxable income; rather the tax status of the actual component firms
(reflecting the consolidation chosen for tax purposes) is presumably
allocated somehow to the financial reporting unit. If so, there may be
no bias in the Auerbach-Poterba transition estimates, which are based
on equity value weights. If the financial reporting unit does calculate341 Tax-Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax Incentives
a hypothetical tax position, the use of financial accounts would bias
the transition probabilities in the direction of increasing the apparent
importance of tax-loss carryforward status, since it will generally be
in the interest of firms to choose an aggregation for tax purposes that
eliminates carryforwards, whereas carryforwards are of little impor-
tance for financial reporting.
A second, and I should think more serious, source of bias in the other
direction was pointed out to me by Roger Gordon and has to do with the
selection of firms for inclusion in the COMPUSTAT data set. Firms in
the COMPUSTAT file have to have survived to the date of observation.
Presumably, firms with tax losses are likely candidates for merger with
profitable firms, and if it is the profitable firm that carries on there is a
potential bias in the data against the appearance of tax-loss carryfor-
wards. Furthermore, because the firms chosen by Auerbach-Poterbafor
closer examination were those showing tax-loss carryforwards on the
COMPUSTAT tape, any such bias would carry over as well to the data
they gathered from direct inspection of company reports. This may lead
to misstatement of the persistence of loss carryforwards.
To put the empirical findings to use in assessing the effect of the
carryforward rules on investment incentives, Auerbach-Poterba make
the extreme assumption that carryforward status is an exogenous sto-
chastic event, generated by a second-order Markov process. That means
all one needs to know to determine the probability distribution of future
carryforward status is the status in the two immediately preceding
periods. Even with this rather strong simplification, accounting for the
contingent quality of carrying losses backward and forward makes
simulating the cash flow consequences at the company level for an
equity-financed investment difficult. I find the details of Auerbach-
Poterba simulation technique hard to follow, but I believe it can be
described as calculating the after-tax consequences of undertaking a
typical investment in equipment or structures for each of the possible
evolutions of a company's tax-carryforward status, weighting these
together by the probabilities generated by the second-order Markov
process (as a function of initial conditions) to produce the expected
cash flow from each of the two investments. In each case the assumed
before-tax rate of return is 6% real, and the "expected effective tax
rate" is the difference between 6% and the internal rate of return on
the company's expected cash flow.
To me the most interesting "bottom line" results are to be found in
table 10.8, which shows the expected effective tax rates under tax laws
in effect in 1965, 1975, and 1985 for firms starting from a position of
two successive taxable years, two successive loss-carryover years, and
for firms that are always taxable (and for which there is therefore a342 Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba
perfect loss offset). The effective tax rates for the first two classes
reflect the balance between the disadvantages of reduced value of de-
ductions and increased value of otherwise taxable receipts in loss-
carryforward years. Owing to the latter effect, the expected effective
tax rates of firms in either initial condition may be lower than those of
firms with perfect loss offset, and in every case the currently taxable
firm derives an increase in investment incentive from the greater weight
on the probability of future receipts that are nontaxable than on de-
ductions that cannot be currently used.
Timing is important to these results and it may be asked whether
they give a sufficiently rich picture of the effect of the carryforward
provisions. The investment opportunities considered consist simply of
current purchase of either equipment or structures (defined by different
exponential depreciation rates and by different tax treatments). How-
ever, there are other possibilities. For example, if a program of regular
annual investment of a dollar per year were substituted for a simple
current investment of a dollar in the analysis, the law with immediate
loss offset would presumably generate a lower effective tax rate in
every case. Another important class of investment possibilities consists
of alternative starting dates for projects, especially postponement of
investment activity, that might be considered. The incentive effects of
the tax-loss carryforward provisions on these choices may be much
stronger than those on the simple choice between currently investing
or not. There are also many other ways than by adjusting real invest-
ment activity that a firm might react to the prospect of being in a
tax-loss carryforward position in the future; restructuring financial ar-
rangements (such as by taking more advantage of leasing) and even
ownership arrangements (merging with a profitable firm) are examples.
In short, there remains much that might be done to build on the
excellent foundation work, both empirical and analytical, that Auer-
bach and Poterba have accomplished.